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The facts 
 
At approximately 1am on the morning of 27th March 2010, the police were called to a dispute 
between a taxi driver and a woman, the Appellant.  The Appellant was being driven in a taxi 
when it is alleged that she started swearing at the driver and generally being abusive towards 
him.  The driver stopped his taxi and asked her to leave but she refused to get out, instead 
choosing to continue her abusive behaviour.  The taxi driver drove her to the cab office, 
where he left the Appellant in his unlocked taxi and telephoned for the police.  When the 
police arrived and spoke to the driver of the taxi, the Appellant again began to shout and 
swear, and then lunged towards the driver.  She appeared to be drunk and claimed that she 
had been locked in the car.  The police warned the Appellant about her behaviour and left the 
scene.  
 
Shortly afterwards, police were called to the Appellant’s home address.  The call had been 
made by the Appellant’s partner who said that she had returned home in a distressed state, 
claiming to have been sexually assaulted by her taxi driver.  The Appellant had then taken a 
knife from the kitchen and was trying to leave the house to find the driver.  When police 
arrived at the house, one officer saw the Appellant walking towards the cab office so he 
approached her.  She refused to speak to him, telling him to “Fuck off”. The officer explained 
that he knew she was carrying a knife and she replied, “They are in my handbag.  They are 
not for you.  They are for the cab driver”.   The officer asked for her handbag, which she 
handed to him, and inside he found two kitchen knives.  After some time, the Appellant told 
police that when she was in the taxi, it had stopped in a side street and the driver had put his 
hand down the front of her trousers twice.  The officers recorded the allegation of sexual 
assault and arrested the Appellant for possession of an offensive weapon.  In interview on 
27th March, the Appellant handed in a prepared statement and chose not to answer police 
questions.  Two days later she made a statement to say that she remembered what had 
happened to her that night and feeling enraged at what had taken place, she had taken a knife 
and left the house with it.  She said she had no specific intention in relation to the knife.  She 
was subsequently charged with two offences of having a bladed article in a public place 
contrary to section 139(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.  
 
Section 139(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 provides a defence for the accused if he can 
show, on the balance of probabilities, that he had “good reason” for being in possession of a 
prohibited article.  At trial, in May 2011, the Appellant submitted that she had good reason as 
she believed she would be attacked by the taxi driver and so feared for her personal safety.  In 
evidence, she stated that she had consumed several drinks that evening before deciding to go 
home just before midnight.  She went to her usual cab station and got into the rear of the taxi.  
It appeared that the driver, who she did not recognise, was going the wrong way.  He then 
pulled into a side street and switched off the engine.  After sitting motionless for a minute or 
so, the driver turned to her and began to pull the zip on her jacket.  She screamed but he 
ignored her and put his hand down the front of her jeans.  After a short struggle, he stopped 
what he was doing, started the car again and headed towards the cab station.  She made 
several calls to the police and when they arrived at the cab office, she tried to explain what 
had happened but the officers would not listen.  She said that when she got home, she wanted 
to get cigarettes so put a knife in her bag for her protection as she was afraid of being 
attacked by the taxi driver again.         
 
Mr Recorder West, the trial judge at Kingston-upon-Thames Crown Court, directed the jury 
that the question of whether the Appellant had “good reason” was a question of fact for them 
to decide using their common sense and experience of the world.  He suggested that they may 
not think it a good reason to carry a knife simply to ward off an attack from a known or 
unknown person, at some unknown time in the future, as members of a gang might.  He 
invited them to consider whether there was a risk of an attack and if so, how imminent that 
risk was and how serious any likely attack would be.    
 
During their deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial Judge, asking: 
 
“When we consider whether the Appellant had good reason to have the knives and whether 
she feared an attack should we consider (A) or (B) - (A) whether in assessing the facts 
available to the Appellant at the time she was actually likely to be attacked or (B) whether in 
a confused and possibly irrational state she might have believed she might be attacked even if 
that was logically unlikely?”   
 
The Recorder directed the jury as follows:  
 
“You should consider all the facts alleged [by] the prosecution and the defence that are 
alleged to amount to good reason for having the knife in a public place. You should decide 
which of those have been proved to the standard I directed you about yesterday that is that 
the fact has been proved by the Defendant as being more likely. When you have identified 
those facts that you find proved, if any, you need to consider whether they amount to a good 
reason, this is a matter you need to consider objectively, that is, would an outside, 
independent observer consider that those facts amounted to a good reason for possession of 
the knife in a public place. You should not approach that question subjectively by taking the 
Defendant's state of mind, whatever you may think it was. The reason why the law does not 
permit that is perhaps obvious, for example, say a person allowed himself to get drunk and in 
that state formed some distorted view of a situation and behaviour in response to that 
imaginary situation he could not say afterwards 'I believed I had a good reason for doing 
what I did although I accept that there was in fact no good reason for doing so and I would 
not have done what I did if I had been sober.” 
 
The jury convicted the Appellant of both counts of possession of a bladed article.  On 6th July 
2011, she was sentenced to a 12 month community order imposing an unpaid work 
requirement of 80 hours and a condition not to attend or contact the cab office at which the 
driver worked.  The Appellant appealed her conviction on the basis that the Recorder was 
wrong to direct the jury that the question of whether she had good reason to possess the knife 
should be considered wholly objectively, and that they should not take into account her state 
of mind and her fear that she would be attacked by the taxi driver (assuming they accepted 
her evidence in this regard).   
 
HELD, ALLOWING THE APPEAL, the authorities supported fear of attack as potentially 
constituting a good reason within the meaning of s 139(4) of the 1988 Act.  As a result, an 
Appellant's state of mind was not wholly irrelevant and it was for the jury to decide whether 
the defence had been made out having regard to all the evidence.  Further, the term 'good 
reason' did not require judicial explanation.  The case of R v Bown [2003] EWCA Crim 1989, 
considered the difference between what amounted to a good reason (a jury question) and 
what was actually capable of amounting to good reason (a matter for the Judge).  While in 
some cases, a trial Judge may rule that certain facts were incapable in law of constituting a 
good reason, the court should be slow to interfere, and should only be adopted if it would be 
perverse in the circumstances to find that a good reason existed.  The Judge should simply 
direct the jury that having agreed upon the facts, including the accused’s state of mind, they 
should decide whether those facts amounted to a good reason to possess the article in a public 
place.  It was not necessary in law for a Defendant to show that his or her belief was 
reasonable as that would impose an unjustifiable limitation on the meaning of that expression.  
However, if an Appellant could not show that his belief was reasonable, that could be taken 
into account and the jury may find that the defence was not made out.  In this case, the 
Recorder’s direction to the jury was unsatisfactory as it suggested that the Appellant’s state of 
mind was not relevant to their decision on whether she had a good reason for the purposes of 
her defence.  They should have been told simply to find the facts, including any facts relating 
to her state of mind and her reasoning, and use those facts to decide whether the defence was 
made out.  By stating that the jury should not approach the question subjectively, the 
Recorder had incorrectly implied that the Appellant’s state of mind should be disregarded 
entirely from their decision making process.  While it was unclear whether a proper direction 
would have resulted in a different verdict from the jury, it was open to them to have done so 
and thus the conviction was quashed as being unsafe.    
 
COMMENTARY 
Three issues raised in this case – (1) whether self protection capable of amounting to good 
reason (2) whether the issue of whether good reason should be considered subjectively or 
objectively (honestly or reasonably) and (3) whether the issue of good reason is a matter that 
requires judicial interpretation for directing the jury. 
 
 The question of what constitutes “good reason” for the purpose of section 139(4) Criminal 
Justice Act 1988 has generated a great deal of case law.  Issues such as forgetfulness (R v 
Jolie [2003] EWCA Crim 1543; [2004] 1 Cr. App. R. 3; (2003) 167 J.P. 313; [2003] Crim. 
L.R. 730) self-harm (R v Bown [2003] EWCA Crim 1989; [2004] 1 Cr. App. R. 13; (2003) 
167 J.P. 429; [2004] Crim. L.R. 67), habit (R v Giles [2003] EWCA Crim 1287) and work 
use (Mohammad v Chief Constable for South Yorkshire [2002] EWHC 406 (Admin)) have all 
been judicially considered, but this is the first of the many cases to consider whether the 
question of what constitutes a “good reason” involves a subjective or objective analysis of the 
facts (or whether the accused’s state of mind is relevant consideration).  In determining this 
case, the Court of Appeal reviewed a number of key authorities on the matter, utilising the 
decision of Evans v Hughes [1972] 3 All ER 412, 136 JP 725, 56 Cr App Rep 813, a case 
involving possession of an offensive weapon under the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, as its 
starting point.  In that case, the Divisional Court held that the expectation of an imminent 
attack by an accused could be a “reasonable excuse” for carrying an offensive weapon for 
self defence.  While the term “reasonable excuse” for the purposes of the Prevention of Crime 
Act 1953 and the term “good reason” within the Criminal Justice Act 1988 are not precisely 
the same, they have been considered as being the same for all practical purposes (see R v 
Jolie ante) and thus the authorities are interchangeable.  In R v McAuley [2009] EWCA Crim 
2130; 173 JP 585; [2010] 1 Cr App Rep 148, a case under the 1988 Act, the Court referred to 
the judgement in Evans v Hughes for guidance.  In McAuley, the Appellant had been found in 
possession of a knife which he claimed to be carrying to protect himself from attack by a man 
who had attacked him four months earlier and who had threatened him five days earlier.  The 
trial judge determined that fear of attack in such circumstances could not amount to good 
reason but the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction, stating that the defence should have 
been left to the jury.  The Court held that carrying a knife for personal protection could 
amount to a good reason if the defendant could show on the balance of probabilities that he 
was in fear of an imminent attack.  It was a matter for the jury to decide how imminent, soon, 
likely and serious an anticipated attack had to be in order to constitute good reason thus the 
judge had been wrong to deprive the defendant the opportunity to leave the matter to the jury 
in his case.  In N v DPP [2011] EWHC 1807 (Admin); 175 JP 337, a case under the 1953 
Act, the Appellant had been found in possession of a metal bar.  He had been threatened five 
minutes earlier by a group of young men in a car and had run off when the group had started 
to get out of the vehicle.  The Appellant claimed to have picked up the mental bar for 
protection in case he was located and attacked by the group.  The District Judge determined 
that this did not constitute a “reasonable excuse” because even if the Appellant had believed 
that he was at risk of an imminent attack, his belief was not a reasonable one in the 
circumstances.  On appeal by way of case stated, the Appellant used the law on self-defence 
to argue his case, stating that by analogy, the question of reasonable excuse was to be judged 
by reference to the facts as the defendant believed them to be, even if this belief was a 
mistaken one.  The Divisional Court held that each case must be determined on its own facts 
and that the District Judge had not erred in his judgement.  It rejected the submission that 
reasonable excuse was a matter to be determined by reference to the defendant’s own 
perception of the facts.  Supperstone, J ruled that when a defendant claims that he had 
reasonable excuse for possession of an offensive weapon due to his belief that he was at risk 
of an imminent attack, it is for the defendant to prove both the belief and the reasonableness 
of that belief on the balance of probabilities. Pitchford, J agreed with this view and also 
rejected the suggestion that the question was to be determined solely with reference to the 
Defendant’s state of mind.  The tribunal of fact is entitled to assess the matter by reference to 
all the circumstances of the case.  The Court of Appeal in this case rejected the submission 
that Supperstone’s judgement was incorrect, claiming that self defence and good reason are 
not analogous due to the differences in legal principles and the burden of proof.   
It is suggested that the analogy with self defence is potentially a useful one.  Taking any of 
the common criminal law defences, they all possess at least an element of subjectiveness in 
the approach to be taken in determining whether the defence is made out.  Self-defence is the 
obvious analogy in this case given the links between the circumstances of carrying an item 
for personal safety, i.e. the fear of imminent attack.  In determining self defence, the triers of 
fact must first determine whether the defendant believed that the use of force was necessary, 
normally due to an attack or imminent attack.  The defendant’s belief must be an honestly 
held belief, thus indicated a subjective element to the test.  If the defendant is under a 
mistaken belief that he is under attack, then he is judged on the facts as he believed them to 
be (subjective view) even if the mistake was an unreasonable one (objective view) (R v 
Beckford [1987] 3 All ER 425).  Notably however a mistaken belief induced by voluntary 
intoxication cannot be relied upon (s.76(5) Criminal Justice & Immigration Act 2008).  
Irrespective, that is a matter of fact for the jury to consider and still requires the jury to 
consider the defendant’s state of mind. Secondly, a defendant must only use such force as is 
reasonable in the circumstances.  This requires the jury to put themselves in the 
circumstances as the defendant believed them to be (a subjective view) and determine 
whether the force used was reasonable in those circumstances (objective view).  Even if we 
were to set self-defence aside on the basis that the burden of proof differentiates it from the 
defence of “good reason”, the defence of insanity, with a similar reverse burden of proof, also 
requires a subjective consideration of the facts.  A defendant claiming insanity must be 
labouring under a defect of reason (i.e. deprived of the power of reasoning (R v Clarke)) (a 
subjective view) arising from a disease of the mind so as not to know the nature and quality 
of the act he was doing was wrong, ir if he did know it, that he did not know what he was 
doing was wrong (again a subjective test).  The burden of proof requires the defendant to 
prove these on the balance of probabilities.  
 
 [ 2 0 ]  The authorit ies, in part icular Manning and Jolie,  also establish that  the expression 
“good reason”  is not  one that  calls for j udicial explanat ion, being an ordinary phrase in 
com m on use. I n those circum stances it  would be wrong for j udges to hedge it  around 
with rules of law designed to lim it  it s scope or m eaning. I n som e cases the court  m ay be 
just ified in ruling that  certain facts are incapable of const itut ing a good reason, but  it  
should be slow to do so. Such a course can be j ust ified only if a finding that  a good 
reason existed would be perverse. Norm ally, therefore, j udges should sim ply direct  the 
jury that , having found the fact s, including, if appropriate, the facts as to the accused's 
state of m ind, they should decide whether they am ount  to a good reason. No further 
elaborat ion is required. I n our view Gregson m ust  be understood as a decision to the 
effect  that  m ere forget fulness, not  allied to other circum stances, is incapable in law of 
am ount ing to good reason. Whether correct ly decided or not , that  appears to be the 
view of it  taken in the later authorit ies. The dist inct ion between what  does am ount  to a 
good reason (a m at ter for the jury)  and what  is capable of am ount ing to a good reason 
(a m at ter for the judge)  was explained in the case of R v Bown,  but  we would reiterate 
the observat ion m ade in that  case that  the court  should be very slow to rule that  a 
part icular state of fact s cannot  as a m at ter of law const itute a good reason. 
[ 2 1 ]  These principles were applied in N v DPP,  in which the court  accepted that  the 
existence of a reasonable excuse within s 1 of t he 1953 Act  is a decision to be m ade by 
the t r ibunal of fact  in the light  of the evidence as a whole. I nsofar as the Defendant  
relies on his own percept ion of the facts,  we do not  understand the court  in that  case to 
have held that  it  is necessary as a m at ter of law for him  to show that  his belief is 
reasonable. That  would involve im posing an unjust ifiable lim itat ion on the m eaning of 
that  expression. All the court  was doing was point ing out  that  if the Defendant  cannot  
show that  his belief was reasonable, that  too is a m at ter to be taken into account  and 
the t r ibunal of fact  m ay find that  the defence is not  m ade out .  
[ 2 2 ]  Miss Lee invited us to hold that  N v DPP was wrongly decided and that , by analogy 
with the law on self-defence, the jury in this case should have been directed to reach 
their decision relying on the Appellant 's own view of the situat ion facing her. We are 
unable to accept  that  subm ission. As Supperstone J pointed out , there is no t rue analogy 
between self-defence and the defences of reasonable excuse and good reason because 
the legal principles and the burden of proof are different . Quite apart  from  that , 
however, if,  as the authorit ies show, the quest ion is sim ply one of fact ,  there can be no 
just ificat ion for m aking a decision otherwise than on the basis of the evidence as a 
whole. 
 
 
Leave issue to jury w ithout  put t ing gloss on it : [ 1 3 ]  I n Manning the Appellant  was 
found in possession of a knife which he said he had used to repair his car radiator earlier 
that  day. He argued that  he had it  for  use at  work within the m eaning of s 139(5) (a)  or 
for  a good reason within the m eaning of s 139(4)  and so a quest ion arose as to the 
m eaning of those two expressions. Henry LJ giving the judgm ent  of the court  observed 
that  where a statute uses ordinary everyday language judges should not  put  their own 
gloss on it  but  leave it  to the jury to m ake their  own decision, cit ing as authority the 
decision of the House of Lords in Brutus v Cozens [ 1973]  AC 854, [ 1972]  2 All ER 1297, 
136 JP 636. He held that  since the expressions were not  used in any unusual sense, the 
judge was ent it led to leave the m at ter t o the jury and tell them  that  it  was for  them  to 
decide what  they m eant  in the context  of the case.  
[ 1 4 ]  Manning and Gregson were both considered in R v Jolie [ 2003]  EWCA Crim  1543, 
167 JP 313, [ 2004]  1 Cr App Rep 44, another case under the 1988 Act . The Appellant  
was found in possession of a kitchen knife which was hidden under the driver's seat  of 
his car. He said that  he had not  known it  was there. There were no keys to the car and 
he and others had been using the knife to start  the car, but  had later m islaid it . The 
court  held that  if the knife had been brought  into the car sim ply to start  and stop the 
engine, it  ought  to be open to the jury t o find that  the statutory defence was m ade out .  
The court  noted what  had been said in Brutus v Cozens and cast  doubt  on the reasoning 
in Gregson which had led the court  in that  case to the conclusion that  forget fulness could 
not  am ount  to a good reason. Having referred to Manning,  it  held that  that  case was 
authority for  the proposit ion that  the words “good reason”  did not  require any judicial 
gloss. Kennedy LJ said in para 17 “Once the facts are known the t r ibunal of fact  can 
safely be left  to decide for it self whether the statutory defence, which is form ulated in 
sim ple words, has been m ade out .”  
 
between 1,500 and 2,500 words  
 
 
 
Evans v Hughes [ 1972]  3 All ER 412 applied;  R v Manning [ 1998]  Crim  LR 198 applied;  
R v Jolie [ 2003]  All ER (D)  356 (May)  applied;  R v Bown [ 2003]  All ER (D)  299 (Jun)  
applied;  N v DPP [ 2011]  All ER (D)  04 (Jul)  applied;  DPP v Gregson  96 Cr App Rep 240 
considered;  R v McAuley  [ 2010]  1 Cr App Rep 148 considered. 
 
 
